James B. Freeman's Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal PDF

By James B. Freeman

ISBN-10: 0511082126

ISBN-13: 9780511082122

ISBN-10: 0521833019

ISBN-13: 9780521833011

While, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an issue? what's the right criterion of premise acceptability? offering a accomplished conception of premise acceptability, this booklet solutions those questions from an epistemological technique that the writer calls "common feel foundationalism". His paintings can be of curiosity to experts in casual common sense, severe considering and argumentation concept in addition to to a broader variety of philosophers and people instructing rhetoric.

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Extra info for Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem

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153). Wellman immediately goes on to elaborate this claim: “We are justified in accepting these premises just because they are not challenged. . In the absence of any challenge, one need not give reasons to support his statement or beliefs” (1971, p. 153). Absence of challenge is a sufficient condition for proponent presumption. For a proponent finds a presumption for a statement at a point in a dialectical exchange just in case he can see how to meet all the challenges raised against the statement at that point.

As Rescher points out in (1977a): “Presumption favors the most plausible of rival alternatives – when indeed there is one” (1977a, p. 38). Our various plausible rival – causal hypotheses for which there is some evidence – are all truth-candidates, but only the most plausible of these may have the status of a presumption. Notice that given a field of truth-candidates, there is no guarantee that one of them will be the most plausible. Two or more alternatives might both be maximally plausible. In such cases, none of the alternatives would have the status of a presumption.

But is this true? If one were a rational challenger, one would bring forward all the challenges called for in the light of the reasoning to date. If those challenges were met, then the statement should be acceptable at that point. But will a challenger always be so ideal? Will the reasoning to date always have been carried out cogently and press all the challenges which should be pressed? If not, statements that should be challenged will go unchallenged. Why should they then be acceptable just because they have not been challenged?

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Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem by James B. Freeman

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