By James B. Freeman
While, if ever, is one justified in accepting the premises of an issue? what's the right criterion of premise acceptability? offering a accomplished conception of premise acceptability, this booklet solutions those questions from an epistemological technique that the writer calls "common feel foundationalism". His paintings can be of curiosity to experts in casual common sense, severe considering and argumentation concept in addition to to a broader variety of philosophers and people instructing rhetoric.
Read or Download Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem PDF
Similar logic & language books
An creation to logical considering and the tips of argument, with 37 demonstrations of illogical and crooked pondering, and the way they're triumph over by way of instantly concept.
It is a replica of a publication released ahead of 1923. This publication could have occasional imperfections reminiscent of lacking or blurred pages, negative images, errant marks, and so forth. that have been both a part of the unique artifact, or have been brought by way of the scanning approach. We think this paintings is culturally vital, and regardless of the imperfections, have elected to carry it again into print as a part of our carrying on with dedication to the upkeep of published works around the globe.
- One Hundred Prisoners and a Light Bulb
- Enlightened empiricism: an examination of W.V. Quine's theory of knowledge
- On the Logic of Ordinary Conditionals
- Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole: Logic or the Art of Thinking
- Computability, Complexity, Logic
- On Hegel: The Sway of the Negative (Renewing Philosophy)
Extra info for Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem
153). Wellman immediately goes on to elaborate this claim: “We are justiﬁed in accepting these premises just because they are not challenged. . In the absence of any challenge, one need not give reasons to support his statement or beliefs” (1971, p. 153). Absence of challenge is a sufﬁcient condition for proponent presumption. For a proponent ﬁnds a presumption for a statement at a point in a dialectical exchange just in case he can see how to meet all the challenges raised against the statement at that point.
As Rescher points out in (1977a): “Presumption favors the most plausible of rival alternatives – when indeed there is one” (1977a, p. 38). Our various plausible rival – causal hypotheses for which there is some evidence – are all truth-candidates, but only the most plausible of these may have the status of a presumption. Notice that given a ﬁeld of truth-candidates, there is no guarantee that one of them will be the most plausible. Two or more alternatives might both be maximally plausible. In such cases, none of the alternatives would have the status of a presumption.
But is this true? If one were a rational challenger, one would bring forward all the challenges called for in the light of the reasoning to date. If those challenges were met, then the statement should be acceptable at that point. But will a challenger always be so ideal? Will the reasoning to date always have been carried out cogently and press all the challenges which should be pressed? If not, statements that should be challenged will go unchallenged. Why should they then be acceptable just because they have not been challenged?
Acceptable Premises: An Epistemic Approach to an Informal Logic Problem by James B. Freeman